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Abstract 
 
Organizations adopting Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) are also adopting standard ERP-
vendor-specific process models for engineering their 
requirements. Making successfully a live process out of 
such a model is hard. Maturity assessment frameworks 
can help ERP adopters identify and understand those 
practices which help their ERP processes succeed and 
those which do not. This paper deploys a Requirements 
Engineering maturity model to examine variations in 
instantiations of a standard ERP RE process. We draw 
on our previous results and our lessons learnt from 
eight years of experience in using ERP RE processes.  
  
1. Introduction 
The ever increasing importance of ERP solutions to 
(cross-)organizational integration and coordination 
problems implies an increase in the importance of RE 
for ERP. This is the concept of applying standard off-
the-shelf process models, composed by reusable RE 
practices and artifacts, that purport to provide most of 
the solutions to the ERP adopter’s RE challenges. 
These models bring RE standards, templates, 
procedures, and tools - that enforce the standards and 
the procedures, to ERP adopters to diverse problems 
when instantiating live processes in specific project 
settings. ERP software vendors (e.g. SAP and Oracle) 
endorse the so-called best practices not because they 
have precisely quantifiable values, but rather because 
successful ERP projects seem to commonly use them 
in RE. A good-practice-driven RE model is therefore 
assumed to ensure that the ERP adopter gets more 
predictable process results and increased chances of 
process success. Published ERP adopters’ experiences 
indicate that standard ERP RE processes did help them 
(i) adapt to changing business environments and (ii) 
develop a shared system iteratively and incrementally 
while harmonizing company’s decision-making 
processes at all relevant management levels and 
locations [15]. However, consistently succeeding in 
instantiating a standard RE model is rare. Indeed, 
typical RE concerns, like protracted requirements 
activities, requirements creep, underestimated change 
impacts, are known to only aggravate in ERP settings 
[5]. In our earlier empirical studies [3,4], we 
investigated  the challenges organizations face when 
adopting a standard ERP RE model. Leveraging 
lessons learnt from our eight years of experience in 
deploying a standard ERP RE process in a Canadian 
telecommunications company, we attempt – in this 
case study, to identify what helps a RE process succeed 
and what does not. Our objectives are to detect 
repeating success and failure patterns of RE activity, 
and to understand how a RE process provides value or 
fails to do so. We seek to address three research 
questions: (1) what do more successful and less 
successful RE process instances look like? (2) how 
does degree of success or failure vary? (3) is the 
distinction between RE success and failure 
immediately evident, and if it is, then to what extent?  
We report on observations of ERP RE process 
successes and failures collected in 18 projects which 
used a standard model to instantiate these RE processes 
in the context of rolling-out cross-organizational 
coordination support solutions based on the SAP R/3 
package, a leading product in the ERP software 
market. Our findings are based on data collected by 
means of RE maturity assessments [3], informal 
conversations, interviews, official requirement walk-
through meetings, focus groups, and document 
reviews. In the rest of the paper, we motivate the case 
study, present our research method and its application, 
and report on and discuss the study’s main results. 
 
2. Motivation and related work  
As ERP is a major trend for the past 15 years, it is 
now well documented that the ERP implementation 
projects often are not delivered on time, or within 
budget, or with functionality that was specified at the 
early project stages [15]. Yet, both ERP adopters and 
vendors are ultimately concerned about lowering 
failure rates and supporting successful RE. Though, 
most ERP literature says very little about how to 
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confront this in the requirements stage. ERP 
publications focus on (i) methodological issues 
pertinent to the end-to-end ERP implementation cycle, 
(ii) the definition of critical work packages at project 
level, (iii) the identification and mitigation of business 
risks in ERP projects, and (iv) the assessment of ERP 
implementation processes from business process re-
engineering standpoint [6,15]. To the best of our 
knowledge, very few authors have studied the 
mechanics of the ERP RE process itself and how it 
leads to successful outcomes.  
 
3. Research method  
Our research approach draws on results from four 
emerging fields: (a) value-based software engineering 
theory and practice [1] that offer quantitative 
approaches to questions like how much investment in 
good  RE process is enough; (b) previously done 
theoretical and empirical studies on RE process 
assessments [7,8,9,10,11,14,18] which brought useful 
insights into the mechanics of successful and less 
successful RE processes; (c) our own experience in 
assessing maturity aspects of SAP RE processes [3] 
and deriving lessons learnt from past practice in ERP 
RE [4]; (d) methodologies for building lessons-learnt 
architectures [9] that guided us in the process of 
documenting, packaging and analyzing our own RE 
experiences in our ERP projects. Our research 
approach is also rooted into the positivist case study 
research tradition [21]. We have chosen this for three 
reasons: (i) it is deemed to be  best-suited to IS 
research situations in which an in-depth investigation 
is needed, but the phenomenon in question can not be 
studied outside the context where it occurs, (ii) it offers 
a great deal of flexibility in terms of research 
perspectives to be adopted and qualitative data 
collection methods, and (iii) case studies open up 
opportunities to get the subtle data we need to increase 
our understanding of complex IS phenomena such as 
ERP RE. This choice naturally means that our study 
couples the RE process maturity assessments with the 
application of qualitative research techniques, as these 
are oriented towards how professionals view the ERP 
RE practices, which they are involved in, and ‘make 
sense’ out of their experiences.  
 
3.1. The case base 
 Our cases were collected and analyzed in the 
context of 18 SAP projects completed between 
November, 1997 and October, 2004 in a wireless 
telecommunication company. In this period, the author 
was employed by the case company as a SAP process 
analyst and was actively involved in the projects. The 
RE model adopted in the context of our ERP projects 
was the AcceleratedSAP (ASAP) RE process. It is a 
project-specific process, engineered and standardized 
by SAP, and provided to clients by ASAP-certified 
consulting partners. The ASAP process has been 
extensively elaborated in [17]. The practical settings 
for our 18 projects have been described in detail in [4]. 
They included the following: To manage 
implementation complexity, each of our projects was 
broken down in a number of subprojects reflecting the 
number of components to be configured. For example, 
the first project had to implement six components and 
was broken down in six subprojects. The total number 
of our subprojects in which the standard ASAP process 
was instantiated was 87. For each subproject, there was 
a dedicated RE team. This is a group of individuals 
who are assigned to a specific subproject, contribute 
time to and run the RE cycle for this subproject, and 
deliver the business requirements document for a 
specific SAP component. Each RE team consisted of 
one or two SAP consultants who provided in-depth 
knowledge in both the ASAP implementation process 
and the SAP components, and a number of business 
representatives, the so-called process owners. They 
were department managers and subject matter experts 
who contributed the necessary line know-how, 
designed new processes and operational procedures to 
be supported by the SAP modules, and provided the 
project with the appropriate authority and resources. 
All process owners had above average level of 
experience with IT-projects in their departments and, 
before starting the projects, attended a three-hour 
training session on the ASAP process. Next, we 
considered our consultants as an even mix of experts, 
new hires and novices. Each expert had at least 5 years 
of configuration and integration experience with a 
specific SAP functional module. Most experts had 
ASAP RE experience. Our consulting partners 
provided evidence that their less experienced staff-
members completed the standard training courses on 
both the ASAP process and the corresponding SAP 
modules. However, none of the consultants had any 
experience in the telecommunication sector; they were 
unaware of the requirements principles in this domain 
and were supposed to carry out RE activities under 
novel and challenging conditions. All the teams were 
supported by a process architect responsible for 
architecting the solution, sharing process knowledge 
and consulting on ongoing basis with the teams on 
SAP reuse, process methods, and RE tools. The 
architect was the only resource the teams shared. Our 
87 teams worked separately and with relatively little 
communication among them. This allowed us to 
initially consider and include 87 process instances in 
our assessment study. For the purpose of our ASAP 
process studies [3,4], we used the definition of process 
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instance given in [8]: this is the “singular instantiation 
of a process that is uniquely identifiable and about 
which information can be gathered in a repeatable 
manner”. We found, though, that 31 out of the 87 
instances referred to ERP implementations within one 
department only. Our interest, thought was in 
implementations covering at least two departments or 
business units. So, we got 56 instances which were 
cross-organizational. We focus on them in this paper. 
 
3.2. Scoping the success/failure analysis effort 
Both ERP and non-ERP RE literature [13,14,15,16, 
19] suggests the following understanding of a 
successful RE process: a standard RE process model is 
called successfully instantiated, if four RE process 
goals are met: (1) business requirements are defined 
on-time and within budget; (2) expected architecture 
design is delivered; (3) project resources are used 
efficiently, (4) RE process stakeholders are happy. In 
goal 3, the term ‘efficiently’ means using project 
resources for doing the things right, provided the 
project team knows what the right things to do are. In 
goal 4, the term ‘happy’ means stakeholders’ 
acceptance and willingness to deploy the process and 
leverage past RE experiences in future ERP projects.  
To get understanding of what happens when making 
the ASAP model a live process, we systematically 
assessed the process instances that we observed in each 
project by means of a standard RE maturity 
framework, namely the Requirements Engineering 
Good Practice Guide [18]. The core of this framework 
includes three maturity levels, Initial, Repeatable and 
Defined, showing how an organization uses and 
follows RE practices classified by three types: basic, 
intermediate and advanced ones. A process assessment 
based on this framework represents a client-friendly, 
transparent and easy way for (i) showing conformance 
with the standard ASAP RE cycle, and (ii) capturing 
information about ASAP RE practices that worked, 
those that did not and those that still remained to be 
practiced. The maturity assessments along with the 
challenges and the methods used in deploying practices 
at higher RE process maturity level have been carefully 
analyzed. Most of our business stakeholders and 
consultants shared observations about how their RE 
processes went and how they felt about the resulting 
products. This was documented in the form of 
experience packages by using the PROFES method [9]. 
It let us derive some lessons learnt [4] regarding (i) the 
practices that have been most neglected during RE, (ii) 
the practices that have tended to be skipped because of 
business concerns, (iii) the practices that have been 
avoided because of consultants’ concerns, and (iv) the 
impact of skipping ASAP activities on the quality of 
the final business requirement. Furthermore, we 
analyzed some completeness and consistency aspects 
of the requirements documents delivered in the process 
instances [3,4]. Completeness was tracked by 
evaluating the rates at which new and unanticipated 
requirements came in the remaining phases of our 18 
projects. Consistency was defined as the percent of the 
initial requirements that turned out to be in conflict 
with other subproject’s requirements or with high-level 
requirements. Once both quantitative and qualitative 
information was collected, we analyzed [9] it to distill 
and characterize common points of success and failure.  
For our study’s purpose, we termed ‘a RE process 
success’ a situation in which overlapping goals were 
achieved: timely and cost-effective delivery of 
requirements, correct architecture design, happy 
stakeholders. We termed ‘a RE failure’ a situation in 
which there was a combination of: missed deadlines, 
budget overruns, decreased consistency and 
completeness of the requirements, increased 
stakeholders’ dissatisfaction, and rework in the later 
project stages due to poor requirements. We devised 
these definitions because: (i) they reflect the nature of 
the ERP RE process as a consultative one that implies 
collaboration on technical aspects and collaboration on 
how the stages of the consultation will be carried out, 
(ii) they stress the fact that the RE process delivers to 
ERP adopters diffuse (or general) value that is difficult 
to quantify and measure directly; this is the value 
resulting from the client organization’s exposure to 
good RE practices and sound engineering principles, as 
well as to predefined working procedures that can be 
repeated in an efficient and well-understood manner, 
and (iii) the definitions rest on indicators representing 
specific, concrete instances of value that can easily be 
measured with the metrics of reduced cost [6], 
optimized time to go live [2], precise cost estimates, 
efficient change management [5], requirements 
completeness, and requirements consistency [3].  
Based on these definitions, the author devised a 
process categorization (for the 56 instances) to include 
some notions about the extent to which a RE process 
meets its goals. The author came up with 7 alternative 
categorizations and presented them to a focus group 
composed by members of in-house SAP team. After 
comparing the merits and the disadvantages of each 
one, the focus group voted and identified the 
categorization that we used in our study; it let our 
process instances fall in five groups that we refer to as 
to A, B, C, D and E in the next sections: 
• Group A are processes that missed the deadline for 
the RE cycle, had higher costs than originally 
planned, or led to rework in the later project stages.  
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• Group B are processes that delivered requirements 
with lower consistency and completeness and/or an 
incorrect architecture design. 
• Group C are processes where the RE teams skipped 
more than 50% of the ASAP standard practices.  
• Group D are processes in which process owners 
remained unhappy with the results.  
• Group E are processes that achieved the four goals 
stated in Section 3 and every RE team member saw 
it and considered that the advantages the process 
brought to the project were used to the fullest. 
In each group, we analyzed occurrences of specific 
practices which were used or not. This knowledge then 
helped us to characterize modes of success and failure 
in ERP RE (which is in Section 4).  
 
4. Results  
We documented the positive, negative, best and 
worst experiences from practicing the ASAP process. 
We focused on examining these ‘polar opposites’, as 
recommended in [11], assuming that some very 
interesting differences would crystallize. The phrase 
‘polar opposites’ refers to RE processes at opposite 
ends of the spectrum in terms of achieving their goals. 
We accounted for only those patterns that we found in 
more than two process instances. Tables 1-4 in this 
section present the results of our documentation 
exercise. They show data as a percentage occurrence of 
a pattern in a group (A,B,C,D, or E) of process 
instances. For example, in Table 1, the first pattern, 
Leverage existing RE practices occurred in 5% of the 
processes of group A, 22% of the processes of group 
B, 10% of the processes of group C, 66% of the 
processes of group D, and 78 % of the processes of 
group E. The row data in Tables 1-2 allows us to 
associate positive patterns with the processes of group 
E that demonstrate achieved process goals, and, thus, 
qualify to be considered as successful processes. 
Tables 1-2 show that 5 out of 10 positive patterns and 
8 out of 10 best patterns have not been observed in the 
group A processes. Next, the row data in Tables 3-4 
allows us to connect negative patterns with processes 
of groups A, B, C, and D that missed one or more of 
the RE process goals. Clearly, we can not expect that 
negative and worst patterns would not be observed in 
the successful processes (group E). Table 3 indicates 
that the negative pattern of Skipping prioritization, 
occurred in 98% of the group E processes and in 84% 
of the group A processes. However, our experiences do 
confirm that the percentage occurrences of the negative 
and worst patterns in the group E processes is 
relatively low. 
 
 
Percentage of groups 
 (A) (B) (C) (d) (e) 
Leverage existing RE practices 5 22 10 66 78 
Develop data dictionary 0 6 10 40 77 
Maintain a small number (up to 
four) requirements traces 
0 0 15 32 98 
Introduce standards at the 
beginning of the process 
15 65 28 62 100 
Understand dependencies 
between process and tools 
82 32 32 67 96 
Systematically apply validation 
procedures 
16 9 18 60 100 
Use reference models 12 15 87 88 100 
Document the rationale for the 
requirements 
16 15 12 67 100 
Systematically address 
controversial rqmts 
 0 12 13 45 100 
Encourage nonhierarchical 
approach to ASAP knowledge 
0 0 14 32 87 
 
Table 1: Positive patterns. 
 
Percentage of groups 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Validation walk-troughs are 
complemented with prototyping 
0 0 0 45 87 
Assess the use of RE standards 18 23 5 92 100 
Map process designs to shared 
value and goals  
0 0 34 66 87 
Evaluate and critique process 
designs prior to configuration   
18 12 18 39 100 
Integrate past, current, and future 
ERP architecture solutions 
0 0 6 23 100 
Re-prioritize requirements to 
avoid customization 
0 0 0 12 100 
Document customization reasons 0 0 0 12 100 
Re-write/eliminate unvarifyable 
requirements  
0 0 12 12 100 
Decompose non-functional 
reqmts as implementable sets of 
functional reqmts. 
0 0 0 0 100 
Set up conversion and interface 
handbook 
0 0 0 45 100 
 
Table 2: Best patterns. 
 
Percentage of groups 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Rely on prototypes to negotiate 
reqmts  
80 82 50 5 0 
Sporadic use of traces 100 95 85 13 20 
Skipping prioritization 84 84 30 32 98 
Skipping requirements modelling    83   79   79   17 6 
 
Table 3: Negative patterns.  
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Percentage of groups 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Exclusive use of prototypes in 
reqmts validation 
67 15 45 0 0 
No validation of built-in data 
control assumptions  
90 82 91 33 5 
No change impact analysis 100 100 100 87 12 
No use of reference models  94   86   86   56 0 
No data dictionary 100 100 67 68 0 
No traceability policies 100 23 23 45 0 
Introducing stanrads in the 
middle of the RE process 
65 45 34 22 0 
 
Table 4: Worst patterns. 
 
Next, to characterize how successes/failures vary, 
we used four descriptive attributes, as recommended 
by Jones [11]: (i) outcome: this refers to the RE 
process goals that were achieved/missed; (ii) typical 
scenarios: these are examples of situations illustrating 
how goals were achieved/missed; (iii) reasons: these 
give insight into why a goal was achieved/missed; (iv) 
process visibility: it addresses if a success/failure is 
well identifiable for external project observers. 
 
4.1. Catastrophic Failure 
We defined the catastrophic failure as a situation in 
which the negative impact to a subproject rises above 
the costs of internal and external consulting resources 
utilized for running the ASAP RE process. The failure 
typically happens through some chain of circumstances 
that leads to bad decisions based on incorrect 
information. However, our experience suggests that 
very few processes (4% out of 56) fail in a way that 
has an impact exceeding the cost of the RE project 
stage. We recorded five ways in which a catastrophic 
failure happened as observed by RE teams: (1) 
requirements brought unnecessary implementation of 
complex functionality, (2) requirements overlooked 
critical architecture design issues as how many 
separate instances, or versions, of the system to install, 
(3) requirements brought massive customization of the 
package, e.g. implementing local reporting formats and 
semantics, (4) RE teams underestimated change 
analysis impacts and, later, changes that turned out to 
be more complex than anticipated, took longer then 
estimated because more affected system components 
were found as changes got implemented, (5) 
requirements turned out to be inimplementable because 
of implicit built-in assumptions of the package. 
Furthermore, our observations provided some 
preliminary evidence into what RE team thought that 
may have caused catastrophic failures: (a) insufficient 
validation efforts, (b) failure to realize early enough the 
problem of conflicting business drivers, which 
challenged the team’s ability to meet the demand for 
higher quality business requirements and the need for 
better control in the early phases of the projects, (c) 
failure to address the risks of having the customization 
of a standard package out of control versus the costs 
and the residual risks of each possible reuse handling 
option, (d) conflicts of people, time and project scope 
due to insufficient personnel, (e) lack of shared 
understanding about transmission and interpretation of 
legally valid business documents handled in the 
system. 
 
4.2. Visible Failure 
Visible failure is defined as a situation in which 
there is at least one process goal that has been missed 
and at least one dominant and easily identifiable (by 
RE team members) cause for the failure. Such a 
process results either in a delay, rework in the stages 
that follow, poor requirements specifications, or major 
unresolved disagreements between the process owners 
and the external consultants. Out of the 56 process 
instances, 14% have fallen into this category. In this 
ERP adopter’s context, our RE teams indicated, they 
observed four visible failure scenarios: (1) the RE team 
rejects reuse options in favor of customization 
requirements with little or no upfront analysis, (2) the 
business blueprint includes requirements from 
unofficial sources, (3) data requirements analysis and 
modeling activities are skipped, which impedes data 
conversion in later stages, (4) process modeling 
activities are skipped, which reduces the awareness of 
explicit and consistent business rules about the cross-
organizational coordination. The RE teans were united 
regarding the reason they thought was the key for this 
failure mode: low level of business integration 
experience and insufficient awareness of both 
mandatory and optional RE process contents. When 
assessing RE maturity, the six most cited themes were: 
lack of shared understanding about levels of cross-
organizational business process and data flow 
coordination; little awareness of the standard ASAP 
practices critical to the project success; less-than 
average experience with integrated system 
implementations; limited competency in making 
decisions; unawareness of the need to explicitly select 
the shared quality concerns (e.g. performance, 
availability) for the design to address; ad-hoc ways of 
documenting out-of-scope and in-scope customization. 
 
4.3. Invisible Failure 
This is a slipping process characterized by at least 
two of the following: (1) RE process adoption without 
adoption of the cross-organizational RE support tools; 
(2) ignoring RE process-tool dependencies; (3) limited 
or no use of RE standards; (4) insufficient or no use of 
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requirements validation techniques, (5) ad-hoc  
coordination between process owners from different 
business units/departments. Typically, such a process 
is bellow average in terms of achieved goals, but the 
RE team might think it is average or better. To casual 
observers, the process may appear as successful 
because it was completed on schedule, the business 
blueprint looked well, and all of the data and process 
requirements that were identified in the RE process 
were in place and, basically, worked in the architecture 
design. The requirements may have been even 
effectively negotiated to the process owners and 
everyone may have read them and signed-off without 
any improvement suggestions. However, process 
owners do not return to the process after the initial 
spirit has worn off, do not show any enthusiasm about 
the prospect of repeating the process, and suggest other 
business representatives to take over the remaining 
stages of the project. Our observations support the 
hypothesis that the reasons for this lack of interest can 
be a combination of: the lack of a mechanism to 
consistently maintain win-win relationships between 
business units; the predominant view that any activity 
which doesn’t seem to directly contribute to the 
deadline gets a lower priority; the not-now attitude 
pushing some RE activities as  “to-do-items” for future 
enhancement projects; the expectation that the 
consultants should figure out how to fruitfully deploy 
the ASAP process; the perception for a practice as an 
unnecessary overhead; the unawareness of the need to 
change policies when RE staff and tools change;  
inadequate training; it means that the team wanted to 
follow the practice but it was impractical in the short 
term to send staff for training. We assume that some of 
these observations are symptoms driven by underlying 
causes, including the lack of clear vision on how to 
balance people, infrastructure and process components 
in ERP RE or the lack of an approach to cross-
organizational coordination complexity. In our set of 
process instances, 10.5% went to this category. 
 
4.4. Invisible Success 
This process mixes both systematic and sporadic 
application of standard ASAP practices, has no 
obvious resource or deadline problems, and delivers 
requirements with average to above average 
consistency and completeness. The RE team is above 
average but might think they are good or very good. 
Casual observers may not notice an invisible failure 
and invisible success differ. Both process instances 
might have implemented similar practices and the 
quality of the resulting deliverables might be equal. 
The way to distinguish success from failure would be 
through analysis of metrics like clients’ satisfaction 
[6], elements of business case analysis [2,15], costs of 
running the RE process and impacts of the 
requirements on the remaining project stages. Invisible 
successes accounted for 19% of all process instances. 
 
4.5. Visible Success 
This is a process that achieved its goals and many 
project team members know it. Those RE teams who 
did it (in 39% of all process instances), pointed out that 
it did not happen due to acceptance to the ASAP 
process alone. A visible success usually: (1) makes it 
explicit how the pieces of the cross-organizational 
business process get divided among stakeholders, (2) 
puts emphasis on what values and goals are shared, by 
whom, and how, (3) blends the standard ASAP 
procedures with the existing RE practice, (4) build up 
new practices in support of the key ASAP activities of 
requirements elicitation, modelling and negotiation, so 
that no delays in the subsequent project stages would 
happen; (5) establishes common understanding of the 
RE process with a focus on what counts; (6) sets up 
and communicates a definition of requirements 
verification and validation; (7)  consistently maintains 
a focus on the areas where requirements are volatile or 
where architecture design drivers are unclear. RE 
teams provided examples which supported the 
hypothesis that all these capabilities helped (i) achieve 
a balanced architecture design and more consistent and 
complete requirements definitions, (ii) get happy 
clients, and (iii) meet time and budget constraints [4]. 
External observers can identify a visible success by 
measuring the extent to which the process changes the 
way RE team members conduct day-to-day activities or 
common tasks. Our RE teams compared what they did 
before and after practicing the ASAP process and how 
they did it. They indicated that a visible process would 
transform certain tasks, job roles and procedures. For 
example, in our cross-organizational projects, 
enhanced the RE process by storing business process 
decisions as corporate knowledge assets, linking them 
to architecture design decisions, and reusing this 
knowledge in any upgrade or consolidation project that 
followed. We also set up a tool for extracting business 
processes automatically from our SAP systems into the 
corporate knowledge repository. This centralized 
repository for SAP business processes, documentation 
and issues, enabled the teams to scope and manage the 
next project’s RE activities cost-effectively.  
 
4.6. Resounding Success 
A process is ‘resounding success’ if it brings 
significant benefits to the organization. The qualitative 
assessment ‘significant’ is to mean long-lasting and 
moving the ERP adopter to ‘a new level of RE process-
awareness, skills, and culture’ (as three process owners 
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put it). This is when good practices are learnt and 
consistently applied where and when needed in ERP 
RE. Such a process does not merely change tasks, job 
roles and narrow-scope procedures; it affects the entire 
large-scale implementation process. 13.5% of our 
process instances were observed as resounding 
successes. For example, our observations suggested 
that, in case of resounding successes, the RE teams 
consistently relied on shared process and data models, 
on architecture trade-off analysis, on change impact 
analysis, and on stable set of ASAP standards. To 
achieve it, we witnessed that all the elements of the 
process mechanics must work smoothly.  
 
5. Discussion 
The analysis and the assessment of our 56 instances 
let’s state that RE process instances had their fair share 
of failures. The implication for practicing RE staff is 
that a well-defined process will only be a success if 
they permit it to. In our experience, some ERP RE 
process failures are harder to identify. We hypothesize 
that because a large part of process value is intangible, 
a large part of failure to deliver value is also intangible. 
To RE practitioners, this means that they should 
identify appropriate criteria to clarify the difference 
between success and failure.  
We explored the relationship existing between 
success and failure modes and levels of RE process 
maturity. The six modes of success/failure were 
allocated to the REGPG process maturity levels [18]. 
Our findings support common sense notions: we found 
the catastrophic and visible failures to tend to be Initial 
level processes. We also observed that Defined level 
processes appear to raise the odds of success. We noted 
however that Repeatable level processes might vary 
widely in terms of degrees to which RE goals are 
achieved. This fits the intuitive thought that merely 
bringing in the generic process model is not enough. 
These early observations allowed us to conclude 
preliminarily that the distinction between RE process 
success and failure is not always immediately evident.  
We also explored how the various process instances 
managed time and efforts. Our overall observation is 
that despite our 56 teams were exposed to a well-
defined RE process model, each of them managed time 
and effort quite differently. Because of space 
limitation, we do not present the resource distribution 
graphically. In summary, what we observed was that 
the RE teams of catastrophic and visible failure 
processes were extremely focused on the requirements 
elicitation end of the RE process. They pointed out that 
relatively little time was spent on documentation and 
modeling as well as on negotiation activities. The 
invisible failures and invisible successes had similar 
resource distribution patterns. The RE teams in these 
two groups spent a lot of efforts on documentation and 
modeling but relatively little on elicitation and 
validation and negotiation. The visible and resounding 
successes were experienced as ones with the most 
effort spent on negotiation activities. Our findings 
suggest that putting effort into RE later might be more 
successful than spending most of efforts in the 
elicitation tasks.  
Finally, we identified and evaluated some validity 
issues that can call into doubt the results of our study 
or the conclusions from our results. We borrowed the 
systematic process in [20] that suggest researchers 
address four types of validity threats: First, the major 
threat to external validity arises from the fact that the 
company, or the telecommunication sector in which the 
company operates, might not be representative for the 
entire population of ERP adopters. We though believe, 
that our project context is typical for the 
telecommunication companies in North America. We 
judge these settings typical because they seemed 
common for all SAP adopting organizations who were 
members of the American SAP Telecommunications 
User Group (ASUG). The ASUG meets on regular 
basis to discuss project issues and suggest service-
sector-specific functionality features to the vendor for 
inclusion in future releases. The R/3 components our 
case company implemented are the other ASUG 
companies have in place to automate their non-core 
processes (human resources, accounting, inventory, 
sales& distribution, cell site maintenance). Second, the 
key threat to the internal validity is concerned with any 
“alternative explanations" for the outcome when 
analyzing RE process instances in terms of achieved 
goals. That is to say that while carrying out this 
analysis, process instances were specific and the final 
assessments were only due to coincidental factors. To 
make sure we have evidence that what the RE teams 
did in the study (i.e., the choice and the execution of a 
RE practice) caused what we observed (i.e., the 
outcome) to happen, we selected representative RE 
teams. All process instances yielded the same outcome 
when specific sets of practices were executed. This 
increased the validity of the teams’ claims. Third, the 
major threat to construct validity stems from the fact 
that measuring the quality of requirement documents 
(e.g. its consistency and completeness) might be 
confounded by the lack of any distinction whether 
requirements are changing because of changing 
business conditions or because of faults and omissions 
errors in the ERP RE cycle. Fourth, we see as a 
conclusion validity threat the lack of inferential 
statistics based on which we can conclude about the 
degree to which the relationships between outcomes 
and reasons are reasonable, even despite the fact that 
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the whole population of RE teams and their processes 
were considered in the assessment. Our conclusions, 
though, converge with observations we made in our 
earlier studies and with experiences shared by other 
authors in non-ERP RE [13,14]. This increases the 
validity of our conclusions.   
 
6. Conclusions 
Most cross-organizational ERP projects deploy a 
standard RE model. Despite its potential of success, in 
this case study of one company’s experiences, we 
witnessed 20% of the processes, instantiated of this 
model, visibly failed to meet their process goals. Our 
analysis of maturity assessments of 56 processes 
yielded the following surprises and predictables: We 
were surprised at seeing that (i) most RE processes that 
didn’t prioritize cross-organizational ERP requirements 
were successful, (ii) one third of all instances could not 
be put in clear-cut success/failure categories, (iii) 
understanding the dependencies between a process and 
its tool-support did not portend RE process success, 
(iv) a process can thrives for resounding success, even 
without a requirements change impact analysis 
practice. Our predictables were the following: (i) 
protracted requirements elicitation tend to associate to 
failing processes, (ii) most failing processes tended to 
be at Initial level of maturity, (iii) the categories 
ranging from catastrophic failure to resounding success 
reflect increased use of data dictionaries, reference 
models, and process designs aligned to cross-
organizational values and goals, and (iv) context 
factors (e.g. RE-process-awareness and business 
integration experience) may impact the RE process 
goals. We acknowledge that we are limited in our 
ability to collect good "before" data to compare to the 
"after" data that emerges once an RE process is over. 
By understanding and properly addressing threats to 
validity, we hoped to make our results more widely 
useful and applicable. We did obviously a preliminary 
step only towards a better understanding of the major 
phenomena determining the instantiation of standard 
ERP RE processes. A least three immediate activities 
are worth spending efforts on: first and foremost, as 
any empirical study, the results may not have general 
validity and should be replicated in different contexts. 
Second, we plan a more detailed discussion of the 
correlations between the success and failure modes and 
the visible outcomes. Third, we look ahead for case 
studies in Dutch companies to enhance our success and 
failure definitions and categories with insights from 
both research and industry experiences. 
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